The significant growth of banking fraud, fueled by the underground economy of malware, has raised the need for effective detection systems. Therefore, in the last few years, banks have upgraded their security to protect transactions from fraud. State-of-the-art solutions detect fraud as deviations from customers' spending habits. To the best of our knowledge, almost all existing approaches do not provide an in-depth model's granularity and security analysis against elusive attacks.
INTRODUCTION
The popularity of Internet banking has led to an increase of fraud perpetrated through cyberattacks, phishing scams, and malware campaigns, resulting in substantial financial losses [5, 48] . Financial malware seems to be evolving through the collaboration between malware creators, growing by 16% since Q1 2016 [14] . In 2016, financial malware infected about 2.8 million personal devices, a 40% increase since 2015 [1] .
This has raised the need for effective fraud analysis systems able to detect fraud with a low False Positive (FP) rate. What makes banking fraud detection extremely challenging is the inherently dynamic behavior that characterizes it. One of the main challenges to address is being able to spot fraud spread across different customer profiles and dispersed in large datasets. An additional challenge is creating systems that are adaptive both to changing customer behavior and to the cultural and behavioral differences in different regions of the world.
Commercial systems do exist, but they offer limited insight into their inner workings owing to obvious intellectual property concerns. Academic research on the subject, on the other hand, is severely limited because of the limited availability of datasets of transactions and fraud (owing to obvious privacy concerns).
To the best of our knowledge, state-of-the-art solutions detect fraud as deviations from the spending habits of bank customers and build black-box models that are not very insightful for analysts in subsequent manual investigations, making the process less efficient. More important, as far as we know, almost none provides an accurate analysis of the model's granularity and an in-depth security analysis against evasive attacks (i.e., mimicry attack).
With Banksealer [10, 11] , we introduced an effective online banking decision and fraud analysis system. Banksealer automatically ranks fraud and anomalies in wire transfer, prepaid phone, and debit card transactions. During a training phase, it builds a local, global, and temporal profile for each user. The local profile models past user behavior to evaluate the anomaly of new transactions. The global profile clusters users according to their transactions features. The temporal profile aims to model transactions in terms of time-dependent attributes. Banksealer also handles the undertraining of user profiles.
While the experiments presented in [11] showed the effectiveness of Banksealer, two important points were left open for research at the time. First, the approach described in the original paper was based on user-centric profiling and did not consider a system-centric approach, in which the detection model characterizes the general interactions between "users" and the bank. This approach has been broadly used for behavioral malware detection [13, 25] . Second, a security analysis of the detection model against a motivated and advanced adversary was needed in order to validate the robustness of the system. For these reasons, in this article, we aim to (1) provide an analysis of the influence of the model's granularity on Banksealer by comparing the performance of the user-centric approach against the system-centric approach and (2) to perform an in-depth security analysis of Banksealer by measuring its effectiveness against evasive attacks in terms of detection performance. We first redesign Banksealer with a system-centric approach (see Section 5) . We then compare the original approach with the redesigned one, using real-world banking transaction data. Thanks to the collaboration with an important Italian bank and leveraging the domain expert's knowledge, we reproduced fraud (in a controlled environment) performed against banking users and recorded the resulting fraudulent transactions. As a result, we can experimentally confirm that user-centric modeling outperforms a system-centric model in terms of detection rate, while the latter has less computational requirements and is more generic (see Section 7.3.1) . We then analyze the security of Banksealer against an attacker who is equipped with knowledge about its inner workings. We implement a proof-of-concept mimicry attack, allowing the adversary to try to cloak fraud and evade detection.
We find that this attack is effective, hiding a considerable amount of fraudulent transactions. Still, we show that Banksealer mitigates mimicry attack and correctly detects such fraud with up to an 80% detection rate and a false-positive rate lower than 10% (see Section 7.4) . This article extends [11] with original concepts, discussions, and new results. In summary, we make the following novel contributions in respect to the previous work:
• We extend and complement the original Banksealer paper by comparing its effectiveness against a system-centric approach.
• We assess the robustness of Banksealer against a mimicry attack in which an attacker, equipped with knowledge of the system, tries to perform fraud that mimics legitimate transactions.
• We provide a comprehensive evaluation of the above aspects by using an anonymized, realworld dataset of banking transactions.
Document Organization
The reader interested in a high-level introduction on Internet banking fraud should start from Section 2, which provides the background terminology and concepts along with a general overview of typical fraud schemes. We highlight the importance of model granularity and the feasibility of attacks that weaken the detection capabilities of a system such as ours.
In Section 3, we review the state of the art of research on fraud detection. We focus on practical approaches and mechanisms that can be applied in real scenarios and that recognize the consequences, or post-conditions, of a fraud. This includes techniques to find anomalous financial transactions in a bank account. In addition, we review the literature related to mimicry attacks.
Section 4 provides a detailed summary of our previous work in the field [11] . We refer the interested reader to the original paper for further details, although we provide enough information to understand the contributions of this work.
In Section 5, we evaluate, from the theoretical point of view, the influence of the granularity at which the spending habits are modeled. We compare the user-centric modeling, used in [11] , with a system-centric one. We discuss their respective advantages and disadvantages.
In Section 6, we introduce the definition of mimicry attacks applied to fraud analysis systems. We present the design and implementation of an attack tool that allows a sophisticated attacker to cloak fraud to avoid detection.
In Section 7, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of Banksealer. First, we compare usercentric and system-centric modeling from the point of detection performance. Then, we present the results of the security analysis of Banksealer against the mimicry attack.
In Section 8, we discuss the limitations of our work and the impact of the security and granularity analysis.
Section 9 provides our conclusions and key aspects of the evaluation of Banksealer from the point of view of modeling granularity and the security against expert attacks.
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION
Banking services are heavily targeted by cyber criminals. A compromised banking account can be used to directly steal funds from the available balance or can be sold on the underground market 1 . Moreover, fraudsters constantly improve their techniques to outwit online banking defenses. For this reason, fraudulent behavior is dynamic, rare, and dispersed in very large and highly imbalanced datasets. In addition, customer habits change over time, making it more difficult to distinguish fraudulent transactions from normal ones. 
Banking Fraud Scenario
In this article, we use the broad term attack to refer to any attempt to commit fraud against an unaware user. Over the past several years, various threats have emerged against banking services. In addition to the traditional threats, such as password database Ttheft, which aims at stealing users' credentials from a web service to reuse them to hack other websites' accounts, or phishing, which aims to acquire sensitive information by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication, the main threat is represented by banking Trojan or "infostealers." This malware leverages Man-in-the-Browser (MitB) techniques to intercept and modify webpages, as well as transaction content, at the level of the rendering engine of the browser in a way undetectable by the user and host application. Endpoint solutions offer little protection because they are hard to deploy uniformly owing to the variety of devices (e.g., phone, tablet, desktop). Also, modern banking Trojans are often able to bypass the second factor authentication, if present, by infecting the mobile device (Man-in-the-Mobile (MitMo) attack) and stealing the one-time passwords (OTPs) sent via text messages, by deceiving the user into entering the OTP when needed, or by stealing the complete set of OTPs (e.g., grid card). Therefore, effective fraud-detection solutions to identify fraudulent transfers are still a much-needed product.
In Figure 1 , we show the typical scheme of a fraud in which a banking Trojan infects the victim's PC and mobile device and has the capabilities of executing multiple transactions (MitB and MitMo attacks) while remaining undetected.
Fraud Analysis and Detection Systems
To minimize the effect of cyberattacks committing banking fraud, banks developed fraud analysis and detection systems that aim at identifying unauthorized activities as quickly as possible once they have been carried out. These systems monitor and scrutinize banking transactions, comparing their patterns with transactions history and scoring suspicious transactions on-the-fly for the analyst's verification. Since all analysis needs time-consuming manual investigation, the number of high-ranked transactions should be kept at a manageable level (i.e., the systems must have a low false positive rate).
Fraud analysis and detection systems must evolve because criminals will adapt their strategies in order to circumvent them. Despite the importance of the problem, the development of new banking fraud detection and analysis methods is made difficult by the limited availability of transaction and fraud datasets, owing to privacy concerns. As a consequence, only a limited amount of papers deal with this problem. Existent solutions detect frauds as deviations from the spending habits of bank customers. Commercial systems do exist, but they offer limited insight in their inner workings owing to obvious intellectual property concerns.
Research Goal
Our previous work, regarding the Banksealer approach [11] , tried to overcome the limitations of state-of-the-art solutions. First, it has been developed and evaluated on a real-word dataset of Internet banking transactions. A major difference between existing approaches is that they do not give the analyst a motivation for the analysis results, making manual investigation and confirmation more difficult. On the contrary, Banksealer supports analysts by ranking new transactions that deviate from the learned profiles, with an output that has an easily understandable and immediate statistical meaning. In other words, it helps the analyst in understanding the reasons behind fraud alerts.
While the experiments presented in [11] showed that Banksealer is an effective approach in identifying banking frauds, several important points were not addressed. First, the approach described in the original paper based its own detection on the profiling of users and did not take into consideration an analysis of the detection performances varying the granularity at which transactions are modeled. A system-centric approach, in which the detection model characterizes the general interactions between users and the bank operations, must be considered. Second, a deeper security analysis of the detection model needs to be considered in order to validate the robustness of the system attacks.
Therefore, the focus of this work is to overcome these limitations, evaluating the influence of Banksealer on the detection quality of the granularity at which the spending habits are modeled and its security against a sophisticated attacker that cloaks frauds to avoid detection.
RELATED WORKS
Fraud analysis and detection, mainly focused on credit card fraud, is a wide research topic for which we refer the reader to [5, 12, 32] , which present a comprehensive survey of data miningbased fraud-detection research.
From the supervised point of view, [2] propose an offline rule-based Internet banking-fraud detection system based on key features, extracted from data analysis necessary for the authors to detect frauds. The proposed technique cannot work in real time and thus is profoundly different from Banksealer.
FraudMiner [38] proposed a credit card fraud-detection model for detecting fraud from highly imbalanced and anonymous credit card transaction datasets. The class imbalance problem is handled by finding legal as well as fraud transaction patterns for each customer by using frequent itemset mining. A matching algorithm based on Apriori frequent itemset mining is also proposed to find to which pattern (legal or fraud) the incoming transaction of a particular customer is closer, and a decision is made accordingly. However, the proposed technique does not consider users that have only one transaction: these users are removed, and the dataset is reduced by half. This is a very strong limitation, because undertrained users are common and also important in the frauddetection domain. On the contrary, our approach handles the problem of dealing with the scarcity of data that might not be enough to train an anomaly-detection system in a reasonable time frame.
Two other supervised approaches are [44] , and [3] . The first proposes a dynamic model that is updated with a sliding window approach. A model is trained each day and used to classify transactions of the next day. For each transaction, it computes aggregate attributes (e.g., average amount, number of transactions) and network attributes based on relationships between credit card holders and merchants. The second applies two approaches for fraud detection: a neural network committee, which is an ensemble of neural networks with different topologies, and clustering. Clustering is used to produce training sets that are given in input to the neural network committee. All attributes are converted into binary variables (e.g., attributes that represent real values are split into intervals while binary variables represent the membership to each interval). The main limitation of these two works is that they depend on supervised information, which is not always available, to build the fraudulent model. Unlike Banksealer, they are not very insightful for analysts in subsequent manual investigations, making the process less efficient. Furthermore, we believe that a general problem with supervised detection approaches is that they usually adopt static supervised models of fraudulent behavior, which cannot be automatically updated and thus always require a manual intervention (i.e., addition of a rule, a label). Consequently, these systems usually have a high false positive rate when a new fraud pattern emerges.
From the unsupervised point of view, [29, 41] propose a detection mechanism to identify illegitimate users and trace their unlawful activities using the Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The HMM is a very powerful model when it works on temporal classification problems and on a large training dataset. In other cases in which the training dataset is not large enough, it can easily misclassify data and produce a high false positive rate [34] . Our approach, instead, uses a semisupervised learning model that lies between supervised and unsupervised learning. In addition to unlabeled data, the algorithm is provided with some supervision information -but not necessarily for all examples. In our case, the supervised information was the absence of fraud in the training dataset. Moreover, semisupervised learning also supports a computational model for understanding human category learning, in which most of the input is self-evidently unlabelled [49] . In addition, unlike our approach, they are not designed on real data. Real transaction data has many peculiarities (e.g., skewed attribute distribution) that have huge implications for the typical statistical and data mining methods used in the outlier detection field.
The approach presented in [48] is interesting, as it combines various algorithms by considering the relationship between events at different points in time to produce an overall risk score. It differentiates fraudulent behavior from genuine behavior trying to overcome contrast pattern mining shortcomings. In practice, it introduces a hybrid model, combining decision forests, cost-sensitive artificial neural networks, and a classifier based on Emerging Patterns to increase its statistic modeling capability and to reduce the number of "false" rejections. Another interesting aspect is represented by the dataset description and feature extraction, which confirms the peculiarity of our dataset and the assumptions made in our previous work [11] . However, this approach deals with the logs of the online banking web application and thus is profoundly different from Banksealer since it does not detect fraud as much as irregular interactions with the bank application.
[45] presents an analyst-in-the-loop security system, in which analyst intuition is put together with state-of-the-art machine learning to build an end-to-end active learning system. The system has four key features: (1) a big data behavioral analytics platform, (2) an ensemble of outlier detection methods, (3) a mechanism to obtain feedback from security analysts, and (4) a supervised learning module. The platform in [45] integrates outlier detection methods based on Principal Component Analysis [39] , neural networks [20, 36, 37] , and statistical models. The previous method and, in general, neural network approaches [16, 26, 31] and decision tree techniques [35, 40] present several disadvantages in the fraud-detection context. For example, they have poor explanation capability, are less efficient in processing large datasets, and are difficult to set up and operate. In addition, they are too sensitive to data format and data representations (i.e., a large number of parameters) that can produce different results. In general, these types of approaches build black box models that are not very insightful for analysts in subsequent manual investigations, making the process less efficient.
A recurrent concept in many fraud-detection works is the granularity at which the detection is performed.
[23] is based on an unsupervised modeling of local and global observations of users' behavior and relies on differential analysis to detect fraud as deviations from "normal" behavior. This evidence is strengthened or weakened by the users' global behavior. From the local point of view, the proposed approach compares a buffer of current session transactions, "current profile," with recent transactions, "mean profile," through statistical methods. By doing this, the system monitors the payment frequency, number of failed logins, and number of successful logins. Global analysis, instead, requires software directly installed on client devices to log in to the online banking portal. This software provides device identification and associates devices with the user's account. The proposed system exploits the global profile to strengthen fraud hypothesis if the login happened from a device previously involved in fraud, weakening it if the login belongs to a legit device. The probability of fraud, derived from the combination of the approaches, is obtained through the "Dempster-Shafer" evidence theory. The major drawback of this approach is that the data collection must happen on the client side, which makes it cumbersome to deploy in large, real-world scenarios.
Other works that exploit model granularity are [6] and [4] , which apply Peer Group Analysis and Break Point Analysis on spending behavior. Peer Group Analysis detects individual objects that behave in a way different from objects to which they had previously been similar. In contrast, Break Point Analysis operates on the account level. A break point is an observation in which anomalous behavior for a particular account is detected. Such techniques present the disadvantages of the unsupervised techniques already explained above.
Two other relevant works that can be applied for fraud detection are [28, 33] . The PhD thesis by Maruatona [28] presents a background to online banking fraud focusing on phishing attacks, followed by a survey of different methods for outlier detection used for intrusion and fraud detection. Maruatona presents an innovative method for detecting fraud by using prudent analysis, a technique through which a system can detect when its knowledge is insufficient for a given case. The PhD thesis by Prayote [33] , presents background on network traffic anomaly detection and proposes a method based on a knowledge acquisition approach named Ripple Down Rules. In essence, Prayote uses Ripple Down Rules to partition a domain and add new partitions as new situations are identified. Within each supposedly homogeneous partition, the author used statistical techniques to identify anomalous data that are reasonably robust with small amounts of data. This critical situation occurs whenever a new partition is added. These methods can be considered complementary to our approach and can be used in conjunction with it.
Though there has been a good amount of research on fraud analysis, the security of these systems against evasive and adaptive adversarial attacks seems to us not to have received much attention in the banking-fraud detection context. In particular, all of the related works presented above do not even consider the problem of evasive and "smart" attackers. However, the idea of "mimicry attacks" [47] is a recurrent concept in the intrusion-detection field. Here, we report some of the most significant work in the area.
In [47] and in the previous work [46] by the same author, the "mimicry attack" concept was introduced. Three methods are proposed to avoid detection: (i) modifying system call parameters; (ii) inserting system calls that are irrelevant to the attack being deployed while minimizing the anomaly rate; and (iii) generating equivalent attacks by replacing the system calls that can easily be identified by the detector.
[42] shows how attackers can render host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) blind to the presence of their attacks. The authors present compelling experimental results to illustrate the risk. They employed four methods to manually change the behavior of the attack: (i) hiding an attack in the blind spot of the detector; (ii) modifying an attack so that it looks like a normal behavior; (iii) hiding an attack so that it looks like a less dangerous attack; and (iv) modifying an attack so that it looks like a different attack. In follow-up work, [43] refines the technique and gives further experimental confirmation of the risk from such attacks.
Using a categorization scheme, [15] divides anomaly detectors into three categories: (i) blackbox detectors that only make use of the system calls; (ii) gray-box detectors that use -in addition to system calls -runtime observations; and (iii) white-box detectors that also incorporate information from the source code, which makes it difficult to hide the attacks. The authors introduce a gray-box model of system call behavior, called an execution graph, and show the benefits and overhead of changing gray-box anomaly detector parameters. When used as the model in an anomaly detection system monitoring system calls, it offers two strong properties: (i) it accepts only system call sequences that are consistent with the control flow graph of the program; and (ii) it is maximal given a set of training data, meaning that any extensions to the execution graph could permit some intrusions to go undetected. Experimental results indicate that expanding the model by using more information would increase the mimicry attack length. In other words, attackers will need more code to hide their actions.
[24] developed a methodology to evade the detection features of state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems [9] and reduce the task of the intruder to a traditional mimicry attack. Given a legitimate sequence of system calls, the authors' technique allows the attacker to execute each system call in the correct execution context by obtaining and relinquishing the control of the application's execution flow through manipulation of code pointers. They have developed a static analysis tool for Intel x86 binaries that uses symbolic execution to automatically identify instructions that can be used to redirect control flow and to compute the necessary modifications to the environment of the process. They used their tool to successfully exploit three vulnerable programs and evade detection by existing state-of-the-art system call monitors. In addition, they analyzed three realworld applications to verify the general applicability of their techniques. Defensive mechanisms against such attacks are presented in [7, 8] .
[17] generated mimicry attacks by applying automatic model checking to prove that no reachable operating system configuration corresponds to the effect of an attack.
[30] proposes a mimicry attack methodology against "powerful system call monitors," a detector that has full knowledge of the system call parameters as well as their roles in the execution of the system call. The authors introduce a persistent interposition attack concept in which the objective of the attacker is to modify the read and write system calls to deploy the attack. Their results show that, although the persistent interposition attacks are not powerful enough to obtain a root shell, they can evade monitors that monitor system call arguments while achieving goals such as stealing financial information or impersonating web servers.
[22] emphasizes the importance of analyzing not only the exploit but also the preamble of an attack. In particular, The authors observe that, although the attacker can modify the exploit component easily, the attacker may not be able to prevent a preamble from generating anomalous behavior since, during the preamble stage, the attacker does not have full control. Their experiment results show that a preamble can be a source of anomalies, particularly if it is lengthy and anomalous.
OVERVIEW OF BANKSEALER
In this section, we recall Banksealer's main underlying concept, describing its functionalities as necessary to understand the granularity and security analysis against mimicry attacks. We refer the interested reader to the original paper [11] for additional details about Banksealer.
Banksealer, depicted in Figure 2 , characterizes the users of the online banking web application by means of local, global, and temporal profiles, which are built during a training phase, taking as input a list of transactions. Each type of profile (i.e., local, global, temporal) extracts different statistical features from the transaction attributes (e.g., average, minimum, maximum, actual value), according to the type of model built. Once the profiles are built, Banksealer processes new transactions and ranks them according to their anomaly score and the predicted risk of fraud. The anomaly score quantifies the statistical likelihood of a transaction being a fraud with respect to the learned profiles. The risk of fraud prioritizes the transactions, combining the anomaly score with the transaction amount. Banksealer provides the analysts with a ranked list of potentially fraudulent transactions, along with their anomaly score.
Thanks to the collaboration with domain experts and after a preliminary analysis of the dataset (see [11] ), we selected relevant attributes. Beyond the common ones (such as Amount, IP address of the customer, and Timestamp of the transaction), we selected the following attributes:
• CC_ASN: the country from which the customer makes a connection, based on the Autonomous System. • UserID: unique ID associated to a user.
• IBAN, IBAN_CC: the identifier of the beneficiary account, and country.
• Card type (i.e., the circuit), and number of the prepaid card.
• Phone operator and number of the beneficiary of the top-up.
From the actual values of all of the attributes listed in Table 1 , we extract the features used to model the user's spending pattern for a total of more than 12 aggregated features (not counting the bin of histograms as features). In particular:
• From the amount, we automatically extract its marginal distribution by means of a histogram. By doing this, we obtain one feature for each bin that corresponds to a range of amounts (e.g., 0-100€, 100-500€). In addition, we aggregate its values and compute the monthly mean and standard deviation.
• From the timestamp, we automatically extract its marginal distribution by means of a histogram. By doing this, we obtain one feature for each bin that corresponds to a range of hours (e.g., 0-6, 6-12). • For categorical features (i.e., IBAN, IBAN_CC, ASN, IP) we count the frequency of each occurrence and keep a feature for each of these values.
• We aggregate transactions and compute the daily and monthly number of transactions.
Local Profiling
The goal of local profiling is to characterize each user's individual spending patterns. It models the features of the user's transactions and assigns an anomaly score to each unseen transaction.
Training and feature extraction. During training, we aggregate the transactions by user and approximate each feature distribution by a histogram. More precisely, we calculate the empirical marginal distribution of the features of each user's transactions. We do not consider correlation between features to gain lower spatial complexity and better readability of the histograms. This representation is simple, effective, and, hence, is directly readable by analysts who get a clear idea of the typical behavior by simply looking at the profile. For categorical attributes (e.g., IP, CC), we count the occurrences of each category. For numerical attributes (e.g., amount, timestamp) we adopt a static binning and count how many values fall inside each bin. After this, we estimate the marginal frequency of the features, computing relative frequency.
Runtime and Anomaly Score Calculation. At runtime, we calculate the anomaly score of each new transaction using a modified version of Histogram-Based Outlier Score (HBOS) [18] method. The HBOS computes the probability of a transaction being anomalous according to the marginal distribution learned. In particular, it considers the relative frequency of each bin to quantify the log-likelihood of the transaction to be drawn from the distribution. The HBOS is computed as follows:
where t i is the ith feature of the transaction t and hist i indicates the frequency of the ith feature. We improved Equation (1) to account for the variance of each feature by applying a min-max normalization [19, pp. 71-72 ] to the frequency of each value. In addition, we add a weighting coefficient w i to each ith feature to allow the analyst to tune the system according to the institution's priorities. In conclusion, the anomaly score is computed as follows:
where f (t i ) is the normalization of hist i that corresponds to the formula
When a feature value has never occurred during training for a user (i.e., zero frequency within the local profile), the respective transaction may be assigned a high anomaly score. However, a user may have just changed one's spending habits legitimately, thus causing false positives. To mitigate this, we calculate the frequency of unseen values as k/1 − f , where f is the frequency of that value in the entire dataset. This method quantifies the "rarity" of a feature value with respect to the global knowledge. The parameter k is an arbitrarily small, nonzero number.
Global Profiling
The goal of global profiling is to characterize "classes" of spending patterns by separating anomalous users from normal ones. The global profile builds a simplified version of the local profile for each user (see Section 4.1), which is more suitable to compute the similarity between users. The global profile is also leveraged to find local profiles for undertrained users. The rationale is that users belonging to the same cluster exhibit similar spending patterns.
Training and Feature Extraction. During training, we first create a global profile for each user. Each user is represented as a feature vector of six components: (i) total number of transactions, (ii) average transaction amount, (iii) total amount, (iv) average time span between subsequent transactions, (v) number of transactions executed from foreign countries, and (vi) number of transactions to foreign recipients (bank transfers dataset only).
To find classes of users with similar spending patterns, we apply an iterative version of the Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) using the Mahalanobis distance [27] between the vectors.
To mitigate the drawbacks of the classic DBSCAN when applied to skewed and unbalanced datasets such as ours (i.e., one large cluster and many small clusters), we run 10 iterations for decreasing values of ε from 10 to 0.2, which is the maximum distance to consider two users as connected (i.e., density similar). High values of this parameter yield a few large clusters, whereas low values yield many small clusters. At each iteration, we select the largest cluster and apply DBSCAN to its points with the next value of ε. The smaller clusters at each iteration are preserved. We stop the iterations whenever the number of clusters exhibits an abrupt increase (i.e., a knee). In all of our experiments, we empirically observed that this happens at 0.2. As a result, we obtain a set of clusters that contain similar user profiles.
Anomaly Score Calculation. We assign to each user global profile an anomaly score, which tells the analyst how "uncommon" the spending pattern is with respect to other customers. For this, we compute the unweighted Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor (CBLOF) [21] score, which considers small clusters as outliers with respect to large clusters. More precisely, the more a user profile deviates from the dense cluster of "normal" users, the higher the user's anomaly score will be. The CBLOF anomaly score is the minimum distance of a user profile from the centroid of the nearest largest cluster. CBLOF takes only two parameters (α and β), which we evaluated empirically by considering as "normal" the 90th percentile of the user profiles. The clustering is rerun according to the sampling frequency (i.e., 1 month).
Temporal Profiling
The goal of temporal profiling is to deal with fraud that exploits the repetition of legitimate-looking transactions over time (e.g., frequent wire transfers of amounts not violating the local). We construct a temporal profile for each user having enough past transactions. It monitors the spending profile of users, comparing it against profiles learned during the training phase.
Training and Feature Extraction. During training, we aggregate the transactions of each user over time and calculate the sample mean and variance of the numerical features. For each user, we extract the following aggregated features: total amount and total and maximum daily number of transactions. During training, we compute the mean and standard deviation for each feature and set a threshold at mean plus standard deviation to classify transactions as anomalous. Undertrained users are excluded from temporal profiling because occasional transactions have a high variance, which is unsuitable for this kind of analysis.
Runtime and Anomaly Score Calculation. At runtime, for each user and according to the sampling frequency, we calculate the cumulative value for each feature. Then, we compute the delta between each cumulative value and the respective threshold. Positive deltas are summed up to form the anomaly score.
Undertrained and New User Management
An undertrained user is a user that performed a small number of transactions. These users are a relevant portion of our dataset; thus, we need an effective way to deal with them. For undertrained users, we consider their global profile and select a cluster of similar users. For each incoming transaction, our system calculates the anomaly score using the local profile of both the undertrained user and the k nearest-neighbor users (according to the Mahalanobis distance, as detailed in Section 4.2). For new users, we adopt the same strategy. However, given the absence of a global profile, we consider all users as neighbors.
GRANULARITY ANALYSIS
Fraud can be performed on a single user or split across multiple users (for higher efficiency and lower accountability). For this reason, anomaly-detection approaches for fraudulent behavior can be roughly divided in user-centric or system-centric depending on the model granularity [5, 12, 32] .
User-Centric Approach
According to the user-centric approach, the dataset is modeled by many mutually independent models that represent different users. As a consequence, an outlier is a transaction that is anomalous when compared to data belonging to a user.
This low-level modeling approach is effective when the "population" in the data is heterogeneous. In fact, as shown in the analysis of the dataset presented in [11] , this can be true for banking transaction data in which spending behavior between accounts can vary according to amounts spent. In particular, we noticed a dissimilarity between system-centric versus user-centric attribute distributions. When analyzed globally, most users tend to behave in a comparable way (e.g., low amounts are more common than high amounts). However, when analyzed locally, some attributes show a skewed distribution, often with more than one modality. In this context, once we identify the spending behavior of a particular account, then a transaction is fraudulent if it is anomalous with respect to this account but not necessarily anomalous to the entire population of transactions. For example, a transaction of a thousand dollars in an account in which, historically, all transactions have been under a hundred dollars might be considered as an outlier. However, such a transaction may not have been considered unusual if it had occurred in a high spending account. Therefore, this modeling technique may lead up to obtaining a high detection rate, since it is able to discern subtle differences between anomalies and normal transactions belonging to an account. Unfortunately, the strength of this model may turn into a weakness when it is tightly fitted to data (i.e., model overfitting) that, in turn, produces a high false-alarm rate.
User-Centric Design.
The user-centric approach, implemented by Banksealer (see Section 4), characterizes the users of the financial institution by means of local, global, and temporal profiles, which are built during a training phase taking as input a list of transactions. Once the profiles are built, it processes new transactions and ranks them according to their risk of fraud, computed thanks to the local and temporal profiles.
Training. During training, we aggregate transactions by user and approximate each feature distribution by a histogram for the local profile and by a set of thresholds at mean plus standard deviation for the temporal profile.
Runtime. At runtime, following the procedure described in Sections 4.1 and 4.3, we compute the anomaly score of each new transaction using the HBOS [18] method for the local profile and the delta between each feature's cumulative value and the respective threshold for the temporal profile.
System-Centric Approach
According to the system-centric approach, the dataset is modeled by a global model, responsible for representing the entire system. Consequently, in this context, a fraud is a transaction anomalous to the entire dataset. For example, a transaction of several thousand dollars would be a global outlier if all the other transactions in the database were considerably less than that amount.
This modeling approach suggests the existence of a common spending pattern between users. In fact, as shown in the dataset analysis presented in [11] , the majority of users tend to behave in a similar way from a global point of view. In particular, we observed that some attributes (e.g., Amount, Timestamp) of the dataset have a skewed distribution with a high cardinality associated to few values. In Figure 3(a) , we show the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on two dimensions that we have applied to the users' profiles. As can be seen, they tend to congregate in one dense cloud of points, with several outlier points and small groups around it. Figure 3(b) presents the dendrogram relative to the application of the hierarchical clustering algorithm. The vertical axis expresses the linkage (measure of similarity) at which elements are joined: the lower the linkage, the more similar they are. As can be seen, there are a lot of elements joined with a high similarity. These elements comprise the large cluster of very similar profiles observed before. Hence, the majority of users yield densely "connected" areas of the dendrogram. In contrast, users with rare spending profiles tend to form small, isolated groups.
This high-level modeling approach is designed to represent global behavior in terms of the interaction between the users and the system and, hence, is more resistant to the overfitting problem. However, the approach has a limited ability to adapt to all possible kinds of transactions (underfitting problem), which may result in both high false-alarm rates and low anomaly-detection rates.
Obviously, it is not simple to avoid the overfitting or underfitting problems.
System-Centric Design.
We redesign Banksealer with system-centric approach paradigms in mind, profiling all of the users' transactions together to characterize the entire system. In practice, the system-centric approach applies the local and temporal profiles of the whole dataset without distinguishing between users.
The system-centric approach does not implement the functionality of the global profile, since it does not work at users' granularity (i.e., it does not distinguish between users).
Training. During training, we aggregate all transactions and approximate each feature distribution by a histogram for the local profile and by a set of thresholds at mean plus standard deviation for the temporal profile.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
As explained in Section 2.2, the goal of a fraud analysis system is to identify unauthorized transactions as quickly as possible so that the banking analyst can take an appropriate action. To evade detection, fraudsters adapt in response to deployed defensive systems. As a matter of fact, most of the attacks arise from financial Trojans, malicious software that may someday incorporate techniques designed to evade popular fraud analysis systems. Therefore, it is not enough to design a system that can detect attacks that are common at the time that the system is deployed. Instead, such systems should also be robust against potential future threats and evasive attacks.
Though there has been a good amount of research on fraud analysis (see Section 3), the security of these systems against adversarial and evasive attacks, defined as "mimicry attacks" [46] , seems not to have received much attention in the banking-fraud analysis context.
To remedy this shortcoming, we present a systematic study of the issue. In particular, we design mimicry attacks for the banking context in terms of an operational research problem and evaluate their power against Banksealer.
Mimicry Attack Theory and Definition
Mimicry attacks [46] allow sophisticated attackers to cloak their fraud to avoid detection. These attacks mimic the user behavior during the execution of transactions but with a malicious intent. In other words, a successful mimicry attack will be recognized as "normal" by a detection system and will not raise any alarm. As a consequence, the more a detection system is resistant to a mimicry attack the more it is difficult and costly for an attacker to deploy such an attack. The formalization of this attack is usually easier for signature-based detection systems, since it requires the attacker to simply generate "new fraud" not known by the system. However, this is not true for anomaly detection systems that require a careful examination of their inner working [47] . Therefore, it is necessary to give a formal definition of mimicry attack, suitable for the banking context and applicable to Banksealer.
Following the methodology presented in [47] , we start with a few assumptions that allow us to simplify the analysis.
Since security through obscurity is not a reliable defense and Banksealer has been the object of research publications [10, 11] , it is natural to assume that the attacker knows how it works. Even for a generic fraud analysis system, this is unavoidable: if it becomes popular and widely deployed, it is extremely difficult to prevent the reversing of the system itself by the attacker. As a consequence, we can assume that the algorithm is known by attackers.
Fraud-detection systems rely on a database of users' "normal behavior." Therefore, it will require the attacker to create some approximation of this database. Users' behavior depends primarily on the transactions executed during the interaction with the banking system. Moreover, in light of the threat scenario presented in Section 2, we can also assume that the attacker can silently take control and infects the targeted user system without being detected. In general, attacks can be divided into (1) the infection phase, when the attacker infects the target systems with a banking Trojan (e.g., exploiting a known browser vulnerability, phishing); and (2) the exploitation phase, when the MitB attack is activated. Therefore, an attacker could readily obtain a useful approximation of the transactions by collecting data from infected systems. Since Banksealer associates different models to each user, it will require time and a lot of effort on the part of the attacker to acquire enough data to build an approximation of the models in use. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the database of normal behaviors is mostly (or entirely) known. Finally, we assume that the attacker will try to maximize the amount of money stolen, always under the assumption of remaining undetected. In fact, in this attack, malicious transactions are executed by the banking Trojan and depends on its persistence in the system: the malware can be detected on the victim's system by an antivirus software or the Command and Control server can be taken down by authorities.
Giving those assumptions, the attacker can now generate a malicious sequence of fraudulent transactions, trying not to be detected (i.e., avoiding introduction of any noticeable change in the observable users' behavior). To do so, the fraudster builds an approximation of the behavioral user's model and simulates the detection system. In particular, the attacker generates transactions similar to the target user's transactions and verifies whether the malicious sequence is accepted by the detection system as a normal behavior (e.g., the sequence of malicious transactions must not trigger any detection system's thresholds). Note that checking all of these options requires a lot of effort for the attacker.
Another challenge from the attacker point of view is that the attacker needs to inject malicious sequences in parallel to the legitimate user's activity without being noticed in the short term. This is done by the "automatic transfer functionality" implemented by banking Trojans: they stop user's activity (e.g., with a fake error message, unexpected operation's delay) while executing the attack.
Under the previous assumptions, the attacker is in possession of the knowledge about Banksealer's algorithms and models. With this data, the attacker can approximate users' behavior and generate fraudulent transactions to trick the antifraud framework and silently commit fraud.
However, the job of the fraudster is further complicated by the fact that the victim must be observed for a time span sufficient to gain enough information to build a significant approximation of both the user's local and temporal profiles and forge adversary transactions that do not trigger any alert. In fact, as shown in Section 4, Banksealer computes the anomaly of a transaction using the HBOS for the local profile (see Section 4.1) and a series of thresholds for the temporal profile (see Section 4.3).
Mimicry Attack Design.
We can now formalize the mimicry attack as a problem of operational research. To correctly design this attack, it is necessary to define the variables under analysis, the objective function, and the constraints to which the problem is subjected.
The goal of the mimicry attack is to generate, for each targeted user, stealthy malicious transactions. As shown in Table 2 , a transaction t is characterized by a set of features that depends on the profile (i.e., local or temporal profile).
The local profile is based on the following categories 2 of features:
• IBAN, which refers to the IBAN of the malicious recipient (e.g., usually a money mule)
• IP Address and ASN, which belong to the customer target of the attack.
Hence, a transaction t can be expressed as
However, the variables that an attacker can control to forge adversary transactions are limited to the Amount and the Timestamp, since the other attributes have predetermined values (i.e., the IBAN refers to the malicious recipient; the IP Address and ASN belong to the victim customer).
Therefore, a transaction t is defined as
From the point of view of the risk score, the local profile computes the risk RISK (t ) of a transaction t of being fraudulent by multiplying the anomaly score HBOS (t ) with the transaction amount Amount (t ), as shown in Equation (6) .
To remain undetected, the attacker must generate adversary transactions that will produce a "low" risk score when analyzed (i.e., transactions are placed in the lower part of Banksealer's ranking). Hence, the mimicry attack will be subject to the following constraint:
where Tarдet_Risk_V alue is the value of the risk score RISK (t ) in the transaction ranking below which the attacker wants to hide and to inject fraudulent transactions. The temporal profile is based on the following features:
• cumulative amount Amount (t )
• number of monthly transactions • number of daily transactions
As shown in Equation (8), for each feature f , it computes its mean μ f and standard deviation σ f and sets a threshold Threshold f at "mean plus the standard deviation" to classify transactions as anomalous when the threshold is exceeded:
In light of the fact that the mimicry attack wants to cloak its fraud, it will hide malicious transactions below this threshold and, in particular, under the hypothesis of maximizing the amount of money stolen, in the "delta" between the mean and standard deviation. In other words, the mimicry attack will be subject to the following constraints:
0 ≤ number _o f _daily_transactions ≤ Threshold DailyT r ansactions (10) 0 ≤ number _o f _monthly_transactions ≤ Threshold MonthlyT r ansactions .
(11) Now, the attacker has all the elements to formalize the mimicry attack against Banksealer as an optimization problem (see Definition 6.1).
Definition 6.1 (Mimicry Attack).
A mimicry attack can be defined as the problem of generating a sequence M of malicious transactions t expressed in terms of the variables Amount and Timestamp:
with the goal of maximizing the objective function
under the following constraints:
In other words, the mimicry attack aims to maximize the amount of money stolen in time, taking into consideration the constraints due to the behavioral models of each user (i.e., the local and the temporal anomaly score of malicious transactions must be kept low).
To solve our optimization problem, we formalized it with the "AMPL modeling language" 3 . As the solver, we used the "IBM CPLEX solver" 4 that exploits the well-known simplex method to solve optimization problems.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION: MODEL GRANULARITY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
This experimental evaluation aims to (1) compare the user-centric approach against the systemcentric approach in terms of detection performance and (2) to measure the effectiveness of Banksealer against mimicry attacks.
Dataset Description
The dataset contains transactions from a large national bank, collected between December 2012 and August 2013. It was anonymized by removing personally identifiable information and substituting it with randomly generated unique values to ensure that our analysis could still link values that happened to be equal. The dataset contains customer transactions related to bank transfers (i.e., money transfers from any account of the bank to any other account), prepaid cards (i.e., transactions to top up credit on prepaid cards), and phone recharges (i.e., transaction to refill prepaid cellphone accounts). Table 2 summarizes the number of transactions and customers involved.
Evaluation Approach and Metrics
We split the preprocessed dataset, described in Section 7.1, following the holdout method, using seven months for building the profiles and the last month, plus synthetic injected transactions (belonging to fraudulent scenarios or to the mimicry attack), for the detection performance analysis. Banksealer works by assigning an anomaly score to each transaction (or user) and by ranking the couple <transaction|user, score> in descending order. Hence, the detection performance is evaluated from this ranking as support for the bank analyst to extract the top N % of the ranking. The value of N is chosen according to the bank analyst workforce; from our information, however, the team of analysts is able to analyze around 1% to 5% of transactions (or users).
After training, we randomly select users and inject (blindly to the systems under analysis) N % of synthetically generated fraud distributed into their transactions belonging to the testing data. Then, we use the system under analysis to analyze the testing data and to rank transactions (or users). As said before, to evaluate detection performance, we consider the top N % transactions (or users) in the ranking. We perform these operations for each threat scenario (described in Section 7.3). Moreover, we repeat the test 30 times and average the results to avoid statistical artifacts due to the injection pattern of frauds to random users (i.e., the transaction ranking is deterministic, but the injection of fraud is random at each iteration).
Metrics. Under these assumptions and considering the top N % transactions (or users) in the ranking, a True Positive (TP) is a fraudulent transaction (or defrauded user) correctly ranked as fraud (defrauded), False Positive (FP) is a legitimate transaction (or user) wrongly ranked as fraud (defrauded), a False Negative (FN) is a fraudulent transaction (or defrauded user) wrongly ranked as legitimate, and a True Negative (TN) is a legitimate transaction (or user) correctly ranked as nonanomalous.
Then, we compute the well-known evaluation metrics of the following: • Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC), which measures the quality of the detection rate in terms of the correlation coefficient between the observed and predicted classifications (ranking); a coefficient of +1 represents a perfect ranking, 0 no better than random prediction, and −1 indicates total disagreement between prediction and observation: MCC =
.
• F1-score, which measures the harmonic mean between the Recall and Precision: F 1 scor e = 2 ·
Pr ecision ·Recall
Pr ecision+Recall .
The last two metrics are particularly useful in classification problems with unbalanced classes, such as ours.
Finally, we graphically represent Banksealer performances with the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC), which expresses the ratio between the TPR and the FPR.
It is important to highlight that these metrics and evaluation, in addition to giving an index of the detection performance, allow us to indirectly evaluate Banksealer from the point of view of the cost of challenging fraud and amount of funds protected from defrauding attempts. In fact, while the cost of an FP is the time spent by the analyst in the verification process, the true cost of an FN to a financial institution is the stolen amount and the loss of trust in that institution. Hence, a high TPR associated to a low FPR guarantees that the system under analysis is correctly ranking fraud while reducing the rate of "false" alarms, which directly impacts the banking analyst activity and the amount of funds defrauded (i.e., TN). Finally, by limiting the analysis to the top N positions in the ranking, we are putting a cap on the costs of challenging frauds (i.e., cost of banking experts and systems). 
Model Granularity Analysis: User-Centric versus System-Centric Experiment
The evaluation and comparison of the system-centric and user-centric approaches is particularly difficult because no instances of fraud were known or reported at the bank. Therefore, we relied on domain experts (bank operators) to enrich our testing dataset with generated fraud based on three fraud scenarios that, based on their experience, accurately replicate the typical real attacks performed against banking users.
Fraud Scenarios. We focus on the most important and challenging fraud schemes today, those driven by banking Trojans (e.g., ZeuS, Citadel):
• Fraud Scenario 1: Information stealing. The Trojan modifies the login form to deceive the victim into entering an OTP along with the login credentials. This information is used by the fraudster to execute a transaction (with a high amount) toward his account, where the victim never sent money. We test the cases of the connection coming both from national and foreign IP addresses. To inject the fraud, we randomly choose a victim from the testing dataset and use a random timestamp for the transaction.
• Fraud Scenario 2: Transaction Hijacking. The Trojan, not the fraudster, hijacks a legitimate bank transfer by manipulating the victim's browser. The challenge is that the connection comes from the victim's computer and IP address. Moreover, we execute the fraudulent transaction within ten minutes from a real one to emulate a session hijacking.
• Fraud Scenario 3: Stealthy Fraud. The strategy of the fraudster is to execute a series of lowmedium amount transactions, repeated daily for one month during working hours, to better blend in. We analyze three cases (very low, low, and medium daily amounts). We use the same number of users of the previous scenarios, each performing 30 fraudulent transactions.
• Mixed Fraud Scenarios: Information Stealing and Transaction Hijacking. In addition to considering each scenario independently, we evaluate the proposed solutions with respect to fraud evenly generated from the first two scenarios to provide a more realistic analysis and to give empirical evidence of the feasibility of our approach.
For the bank transfers dataset, the money can be transferred to a national or foreign account, whereas for the phone recharges and prepaid debit cards, the money is charged on an unknown card. Table 3 shows the features' values of injected frauds.
Model Granularity Analysis Results.
In this section, we present the results of the granularity analysis. We injected the 1% of fraudulent transactions. For the evaluation, we considered the top 1% transactions (or users) in the final ranking from those classified as anomalous. We show the results for the bank transfers context only for the sake of brevity, but similar results were obtained for the other contexts (i.e., prepaid cards and phone recharges).
The overall results are summarized in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . The user-centric approach outperforms the system-centric approach in almost all fraud scenarios under analysis, confirming its power in the banking fraud detection context.
From the ROC curves presented in Figure 4 (a) and Figure 4 (b), it can be seen that both approaches show similar trends in the first part of the curves (i.e., high TPR and low FPR), but diverge progressively as the number of ranked transactions grows, leading the user-centric's curves to dominate the system-centric's curves. While for Scenario 1 the performance of the systemcentric and the user-centric approaches are comparable, since the injected frauds are inherently globally anomalous, this is not true for Scenario 2 and even more for Scenario 3. In fact, the system-centric approach in these two scenarios cannot easily distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent transactions due to their similarity. For these reasons, the system-centric's curves (and performance) are much lower than the user-centric's ones. These results are also confirmed by the graph shown in Figure 4 (b), which shows the Recall varying the number of transactions ranked as fraudulent.
However, it is interesting to observe that the performances of the system-centric approach are comparable (except for Scenario 3, in which the system-centric approach has the worst overall performances) with one of the user-centric approaches under the influence of undertrained users. Sometimes, the system-centric approach is even better than the user-centric approach, considering undertrained users. This is easily explainable since the system-centric approach does not make a distinction between users and considers the global behavior of users in a similar way to what the undertrained management in the user-centric approach does.
The system-centric approach has also a lower overall precision (see Figure 4 (c)) in all scenarios under analysis. In other terms, incidences of fraud are more scattered in the ranking and, hence, it would require the analyst more time to analyze them.
From Figure 4 (f) and Figure 5 (f), it can be observed that both system-centric and user-centric approaches have a positive Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) and, hence, a positive correlation between the observed (i.e., injected fraud) and predicted classification (i.e., transactions ranked as fraud). Coherently with previous metrics, the system-centric MCC is lower the usercentric MCC in all considered scenarios. These findings are confirmed by Figures 4(e) and 5(e) that show the trend of the F-measure varying the number of transactions ranked as fraud. Consequently, both metrics confirm that the user-centric approach is able to better detect frauds. Table 4 summarizes the performance comparison between the user-centric approach (for welltrained users only and with undertrained users) and the system-centric approach, analyzing the top 1% of the ranking (see Section 7.2 for further details on the evaluation approach). It confirms the superior detection capabilities of the user-centric approach compared with the system-centric approach.
The results on the information-stealing scenario (Scenario 1) are very promising; both the usercentric and system-centric approaches reach high performance. In fact, while the user-centric approach reaches a TPR up to 98% with an FPR of 0.01%, a precision of 98%, a F-1 measure of 98%, and an MCC of 0.98, the system-centric approach reaches a TPR of 97% with an FPR of 0.02, with a precision of 97%, an F-1 measure of 97%, and an MCC of 0.97.
Transaction hijacking frauds (Scenario 2) are particularly challenging, because the malware does not alter the overall amount of transactions performed but it leverages existing transactions by diverting them to a different recipient. The IP address is one of those usually employed by the user and, in the case in which the recipient fraudulent account is national, these transactions blend in quite easily. In fact, while the user-centric approach reaches a TPR up to 81% with an FPR of 0.2, with a precision of 81%, an F-1 measure of 81%, and an MCC of 0.80, the system-centric approach reaches a TPR up to 77% with an FPR of 0.2, with a precision of 77%, an F-1 measure of 77%, and Fig. 4 . Model granularity analysis: Performance of the user-centric approach varying N, the number of transactions ranked as fraudulent, and for each of the fraudulent scenarios. The label "UT" means "with undertrained users"; "L" and "T" refer to the local and temporal profiles, respectively. Labels "1," "2," "3," and "mix" refer to the fraudulent "scenario 1 -info stealing," "scenario 2 -transaction hijacking," "scenario 3 -stealthy fraud," and "mixed scenario," respectively. Fig. 5 . Model granularity analysis: Performance of the system-centric approach varying N, the number of transactions ranked as fraudulent, and for each of the fraudulent scenarios. The label "L" refers to the local profile. Labels "1," "2," "3," and "mix" refer to the fraudulent "scenario 1 -info stealing," "scenario 2 -transaction hijacking," "scenario 3 -stealthy fraud," and "mixed scenario," respectively. an MCC of 0.77. However, in the case of national IBAN addresses, both performances drastically drop, especially for the system-centric approach. In particular, user-centric's TPR goes down to 45% (FPR = 0.5%) and system-centric's TPR down to 18% (FPR = 0.8%). Stealthy fraud (Scenario 3) is also challenging: the user-centric and system-centric approaches perform well when the recipient account is foreign, with a TPR up to 72% with an FPR of 8%, a precision of 72%, an F-1 measure of 72%, and an MCC of 0.62 for both. When the recipient is national, the performance is halved for the user-centric approach and reduced to a seventh for system-centric approach.
In general, it can be observed that when fraud contains attributes with foreign value (i.e., different from national) the system-centric performances are almost equivalent to the user-centric performances with undertrained users. However, in the case of more "smart" fraud, system-centric performances decay rapidly. This can be explained by the fact that the system-centric approach better catches the general behavior of users that tend to execute transactions from a national IP to a national IBAN. The accuracy of both approaches (see Figure 5 The overall results in the more general fraudulent scenario (i.e., the mixed fraud scenario) summarized in Figure 6 are consistent with the ones obtained in [11] , with the user-centric approach outperforming the system-centric and other state-of-the-art approaches. Hence, it is more suitable for banking fraud detection. For example, [48] detects up to 60-70% of fraud with an unreported precision, while in Figure 6 , Banksealer's ROC curves dominate the more general approaches of the PCA-based outlier analysis [39] and the time-window-based approach [44] .
Besides the lower performances, the system-centric approach can be a perfect lightweight candidate solution for mitigating the undertraining problem. In fact, its performance is comparable with the user-centric one under the influence of undertrained users.
Security Analysis: Mimicry-Attack Experiment
In this section, we report on experimental evidence regarding the power of mimicry attacks. We show the results for the bank transfers context only for the sake of brevity, but similar results were obtained for the other contexts (i.e., prepaid cards and phone recharges).
With respect to the evaluation procedure described in Section 7.2, the attacker progressively trains the system (i.e., builds users' models) With one month of data and computes the scoring for the sequent. By doing this, the attacker selects "vulnerable users" (i.e., users that allow a fraudulent injection) and collects the information necessary for carrying out the mimicry attack: users' spending patterns (e.g., amount, number of transaction executed) and risk scores given by Banksealer. Then, the attacker automatically generates fraudulent transactions that satisfy the constraints expressed in Equation (7), Equation (9), Equation (10), and Equation (11) to maximize the amount of money stolen in time (see Section 6).
Mimicry attack scenarios.
We focus on four mimicry attack scenarios that differ in terms of number of transactions injected and "predicted" risk scores associated to each transaction (i.e., position in the ranking below which the attacker wants to hide the fraud):
• Scenario 50. The attacker injects only 1% of the generated fraud, aiming at a risk score equal to or below the 50th percentile of the ranking.
• Scenario 50A. The attacker injects all the generated fraud, aiming at a risk score equal to or below the 50th percentile of the ranking.
• Scenario 75. The attacker injects 1% of the generated fraud, aiming at a risk score equal to or below the 75th percentile of the ranking.
• Scenario 75A. The attacker injects all of the generated fraud, aiming at a risk score equal to or below the 75th percentile of the ranking.
Security Analysis Results.
In Figure 7 , we show the overall performance of Banksealer against the designed mimicry attacks. As expected, detection performance is lower with respect to [11] . In fact, the performance curves, if compared with the respective ones in Figure 4 , are stretched and have a lower slope in the first half. This is caused by the mimicry attack that tries to hide injected transactions, making them look similar to legitimate ones. By doing this, fraud instances are spread and located by design in lower positions of the ranking. The slope is even greater when undertrained users are considered, since they introduce additional noise in the dataset that eases the work of attackers to hide their tracks. From the point of view of Banksealer's ranking, this is translated into a greater number of transactions to be ranked in order to detect all fraud.
In general, the performance shows a comparable trend in all mimicry attack scenarios under analysis and can be interpreted as the capability of Banksealer to recognize fraud independently from the attack scenario.
From the ROC presented in Figure 7 (a), it can be seen that the curves have a smaller area under the curve and that Banksealer's ranking is characterized by a greater FPR and lower TPR. The lower detection rate is even more evident if analyzed in Figure 4 (b), which shows the Recall varying the number of transactions ranked as fraudulent.
Scenario 50A and Scenario 75A have an overall higher precision ( Figure 7(c) ), F-1 measure (Figure 7 (e)), and MCC (Figure 7 (f)) with respect to Scenario 50 and Scenario 75, which present low values for all of the presented metrics. In contrast, the last two scenarios have a better Recall. However, this is simply due to the fact that Scenario 50A and Scenario 75A inject a greater number of adversarial frauds (e.g., ∼10,000 w.r.t. ∼100), which are easier to detect but require a wider range in the ranking in order for all to be detected.
Finally, the temporal profile shows the worst performances from the point of view of all of the evaluation metrics under analysis. This is because three of the four constraints were designed to hide transactions below their thresholds. In particular, the area under the curve for the temporal profile is very low, since it can hardly distinguish between fraud and legitimate transactions. This represents a strong limitation of the Banksealer prototype, which needs to be mitigated in future works. Table 5 summarizes the performance of Banksealer (for well-trained users only and with undertrained users), analyzing the top N % of the ranking (with N = 1, 5, 11, and % number of fraud injected).
The results in Scenario 50A and Scenario 75A, analyzing the top N % of the ranking, are very promising. Banksealer reaches a TPR up to 88% with an FPR around 5%, a precision close to 90%, an F-1 measure around 80%, and an MCC close to 0.8. In this scenario, undertrained users degrade performance by a factor of 15%. Instead, the performance of the same two scenarios drops, analyzing only the top 1% of the ranking. In fact, Banksealer reaches a TPR up to 5% with an FPR around 0.3%, a precision close to 80%, an F-1 measure around 6%, and an MCC close to 0.1.
However, as shown by the value of the precision and of FPR, Banksealer is able to mitigate the mimicry attack pushing up and gathering fraud in the ranking. The very low value of the other evaluation metrics is due to the number of ranked transactions that is only a small fraction of the total fraud injected in the dataset.
Scenario 50 and Scenario 75 are particularly challenging, because the attacker injects only 1% of the fraudulent transactions generated. This means that the attacker wants to reduce the chance of being detected at the cost of stealing a two-order-of-magnitude lower amount of money. If the top 1% of the ranking is analyzed, Banksealer reaches a TPR up to 20% with an FPR around 1%, a Fig. 7 . Security analysis: Performance of Banksealer against mimicry attacks, varying N and the number of transactions ranked as fraudulent. The label "UT" means "with undertrained users"; "L" and "T" refer to the local and temporal profiles, respectively. Regarding the mimicry fraud scenarios: "A" means that all fraudulent transactions are injected, 1% otherwise; "50" and "75" mean that fraud injected aims at a risk score equal to or below the 50th and the 75th percentile of the ranking, respectively. precision close to 10%, an F-1 measure around 10%, and an MCC close to 0.1. The performance is even lower when considering undertrained users. However, it is important to highlight that Banksealer is able to mitigate the mimicry attack pushing fraud in the top 5% of the ranking for well-trained users (i.e., all fraud is detected in the first 3,000 ranked transactions) and top 11% (i.e., all fraud is detected in the first 8,000 transactions) of the ranking also considering undertrained users. This allows detection of at least the majority of instances of fraud and thus enables one to stop them.
DISCUSSION
From the point of view of granularity analysis, the obtained results strictly depend on the data available. In fact, the user-centric approach is feasible when there are enough data to build a welltrained model for enough users. Otherwise, it will be highly influenced by the noise produced by undertrained profiles. The system-centric approach can be a perfect lightweight candidate solution for mitigating the undertraining problem. In fact, the system-centric approach profiles all transactions together to characterize the entire system. By doing this, it automatically mitigates the undertraining problem, since it directly exploits the global knowledge of the dataset for the computation of the anomaly score. In addition, system-centric modeling has less computational requirements and offers more generalization than the user-centric approach. In fact, the time complexity is linear with respect to the number of transactions and features. Hence, the decision regarding what kind of approach to apply depends on resource availability and the acceptable detection error level.
From the point of view of security analysis, security against mimicry attacks is a well-known problem in the intrusion detection domain [47] . It is important to highlight that, at this writing, we are not aware of banking Trojan variants able to perform such complex techniques of evasion. However, due to the highly active underground market, evasive techniques will likely be implemented in financial malware as soon as an advanced defensive system, such as Banksealer, will be adopted enough by financial institutions to justify such an investment. Nevertheless, as anticipated before, the actual generation of banking Trojans already has displayed techniques to extract sensitive data (e.g., financial transactions) from the compromised system. This is further evidence of the importance of analyzing the security of fraud detection systems in order to make them more robust to this kind of evasive attack. Moreover, to develop an attack such as the one that we developed in Section 6, an attacker needs to meet very high requirements: an attacker needs to know the entire history of a user and a good estimation of setup parameters. Even if a malware sample could possibly recover part of the needed data from the history of transactions displayed in web applications, the attacker will need an estimation of parameter setup, which is a much harder task to achieve. In addition, to reduce the attack surface, the database of normal behavior should be as minimal and precise as possible.
In light of the experiment presented in Section 7.4.1, we recommend that all future published works proposing new fraud-detection designs should include a detailed analysis of security against evasive attacks. Even if this type of attack cannot be completely countered through clever design, it seems worthwhile to carefully evaluate the risks. We believe that our research gives some specific guidance on how to tackle the fraud-detection problem.
Finally, we discuss the effectiveness of mimicry attacks against both approaches. In the systemcentric environment, an attacker must compute hindering thresholds once. Then the attacker can freely use the threshold to defraud any user of the system. Instead, the user-centric models have a per-user (or at least per few users) set of thresholds. Hence, a detection system based on a usercentric approach requires more effort from an attacker that wants to "mimic" users' behaviors.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we addressed the limitations of [11] by analyzing the problem of the influence of model granularity on detection performance and making an in-depth security analysis of the proposed fraud-detection system.
From the point of view of granularity analysis, we compared user-centric modeling, which builds a model for each user, with system-centric modeling, which builds a model for the entire system. We analyzed advantages and disadvantages of the two modeling strategies from the point of view of their effectiveness and showed that the user-centric approach exhibits superior performance over the system-centric one in the banking fraud-detection context.
From the point of view of security analysis, we evaluated Banksealer against an attacker equipped with the knowledge of the system and able to perform a mimicry attack that allows the attacker to cloak fraud to avoid detection and hide a considerable amount of fraudulent transactions from the top ranking. We showed that Banksealer can mitigate these attacks, correctly detecting evasive fraud with up to a 70% detection rate, pushing fraud in higher positions and making fraud analysis faster.
Finally, we discussed the relationship between the granularity of the model, resource availability, and acceptable error level. In addition, we highlighted the impact of our security analysis with an overall final vision on banking fraud-detection systems.
The main barrier in this research field is the lack of publicly available, real-world fraud and a ground truth for validation. Even if data used to train our system came from a real dataset, it lacks incidences of fraud. We had to resort to synthetically generated fraud, with help of experts.
It is important to highlight that the research work presented in this article brings new solid contributions since, to the best of our knowledge, none of the state-of-the-art works described in Section 3 addressed this case study analysis. This evaluation methodology, with the proper adaptations (i.e., redesign for a system-centric approach and mimicry formalization), could be applied to
